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The political economy of food aid to Palestine
Numan Kanafani and Samia Al-Botmeh
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it provides an assessment of theextraordinary deterioration in food security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip(WBGS) since the outbreak of the second intifada (popular uprising) in 2000.
Second, it argues that food insecurity in the WBGS is mainly a result of lack of access
to food, both physical and economic. Lack of physical access refers to the severe
restrictions on the movement of people and goods imposed by the Israeli army, and
which take the form of closures, curfews, construction of a separation wall, and land
confiscation. Lack of economic access refers to the income deterioration due to high
unemployment and loss of business, which have been among the immediate
consequences of the restrictions on movements.
A World Bank report notes that
the Palestinian recession is one of
the worst in recent history, with
average personal incomes having
declined by more than a third
between 2000 and 2004 and about
half of the population living below
the poverty line.  Consequently, the1
sta te  of food security has
deteriorated to such an extent that
the W orld Food Program (WFP)
designated over one-half of the WBGS’s population as being food insecure in 2006.2
Trends in the Palestinian economy reveal strong relationships among movement
restrictions, economic growth, and food (in)security. Progress toward food security
has been made when, on the demand side, people and goods could move freely, hence
when earnings and incomes rise. On the supply side, movement restrictions increase
the transaction costs of food shipments and result in higher prices, hence making food
less accessible.
The article shows how food aid is used to mitigate some of the worst effects of
food insecurity but stresses that the poverty alleviation effects of food aid programs
are rather limited. Food aid, especially in the case of WBGS, treats only the symptoms
rather than the roots of the food insecurity crisis. Prolonged physical restriction on
movements, with all that this entails for market fragmentation, severe price distortion,
the shortage of imported inputs, and loss of export markets threatens to irreversibly
destroy Palestinians’ domestic productive capacities. This will make the WBGS’s
dependency on food aid permanent and turn a whole nation, otherwise capable to a
great extent of fending for itself, into isolated communities permanently dependent
on the charity of others.
Food insecurity in Palestine is primarily an outcome of a regional political
dysfunction, but the international community addresses this as being an outcome of
technical and/or natural dysfunctions: the international community responded to a
food crisis by pouring in food aid rather than by doing what is needed to allow people
to move about and work. Undoubtedly, humanitarian aid has saved lives, yet food aid
can never be a sustainable solution to alleviate poverty and foster people’s dignity.
In spite of political turbulence, the WBGS was moving steadily toward a better
state of food security during the second half of the 1990s. Domestic food supplies as
well as access to food were improving. This positive trend was violently disrupted
toward the end of 2000 and culminated two years later when the Israeli army
reoccupied the whole WBGS. A man-made catastrophe then cast a heavy shadow over
the lives of Palestinians, with grave repercussions for food security. To illustrate these
developments, the article starts with some background on the main features of the
WBGS economy. We then shed light on the peculiar phenomenon of closure — the
caging of a population by imposing severe physical restrictions on its movements —
so that the reader may gain an idea of the dimension of the socio-economic and
political catastrophe witnessed in the WBGS since 2000. In the second section, we
assess policy issues with regard to food insecurity in Palestine by tracing trends in
food supply and food consumption. Section three identifies the main stakeholders in
the food aid business. In section four, the scope of and limits to food aid policy in
Palestine are addressed.
Background
The economy
In spite of considerable fluctuations, the WBGS economy witnessed strong growth
trends during the 1995 to 1999 period. These came about as a result of a general sense
of optimism about a future peace settlement as well as the relative ease of access to
external markets, including the Israeli labor market. Fixed investment was over 33
percent of GDP in every year during 1994-1999, and reached 45 percent in 1999.3
Most of this was undertaken by the private sector, although with a large proportion
in residential buildings. During the same period, the employment rate increased
gradually from 61 to 83 percent of the labor force (see Table A1 appended to this
article). Palestinian employment in Israel reached an average of 134,000 workers in
1999, accounting for about 23 percent of total Palestinian employment.  These4
favorable trends resulted in improved standards of living and were reflected in modest
poverty rates (20 percent of the WBGS population in 1999). Food insecurity was a
concern for a relatively limited segment of the Palestinian population, mostly those
incapacitated by severe poverty.
Toward the end of the 1990s, relations between Israel and the Palestinian
Food insecurity in Palestine is
primarily the outcome of a political
dysfunction addressed by the
international community as if it were a
technical and/or natural problem. But
rather than food aid, what is needed is
the restoration of Palestinians right to
unrestricted movement and work.
The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, ISSN 1749-852X Kanafani and Al-Botmeh, Food aid to Palestine     p. 40
© www.epsjournal.org.uk – Vol. 3, No. 2 (2008)
Authority (PA) started to deteriorate. To force the PA into political compromises,
Israel began to economically squeeze the WBGS. The PA, in turn, felt that Israel was
not serious in meeting its obligations for the establishment of an independent,
sovereign Palestinian state. As hope faded, a vicious cycle of violence and counter-
violence dominated the scene. Many of the potentially positive aspects of the Oslo
Accords on the Palestinian economy, such as free access to the rich Israeli market and
outside world, safe-passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and the relatively free
flow of Palestinian labor to Israel became irregular, unpredictable, and subject to the
total unchallengeable discretion of Israel’s policymakers.
A man-made catastrophe
The overall climate for progress toward achieving increased access to food for all was
abruptly cut off with the second intifada in September 2000.  The main feature of this5
new state of affairs has been the intensification and institutionalization of restrictions
placed on the free movement of Palestinian people and goods. These restrictions take
various forms, including closures, flying checkpoints, road blocks, curfews, and the
separation barrier (which in some sections reaches 12 meter high and goes through the
midst of urban, rural, and refugee Palestinian centers).6
Closures in the WBGS have taken three forms: (1) internal closure prohibiting
movement within the WBGS, reinforced by curfews; (2) external closure of the border
between Israel and the WBGS (and thus also between the West Bank and Gaza); and
(3) external closing of international crossings between the West Bank and Jordan, and
between Gaza and Egypt. During 1993 and 1999, the WBGS were subject to a total
of 311.5 days of complete external closure.  Days of (complete and partial) closure7
increased sharply after the intifada. For instance, 2002 saw more than 250 days of
closure, which means that Palestinians had not even 4 months of unrestricted
movement during the whole year (Figure 1).
Movement restrictions have adversely affected the entire food chain in the WBGS,
that is, domestic production, food imports, the ability to reach and provide food to the
needy, food prices, and most importantly people’s economic access to food. Israeli
imposed closures, curfews, incursions, land confiscation, and destruction of
productive properties combined to bring the Palestinian economy to its knees,
resulting in unprecedented levels of unemployment and poverty. At the same time,
clearance revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the PA were being withheld and
domestic public revenues started to decline as a result of rising unemployment and
reduced demand. The drastic decline in revenues came just when a much stronger
social welfare net was needed.  By 2002, real per capita income had fallen to 548
percent of the 2000 level and over one-half of the population was living below the
poverty line (Table A1).
A World Bank report estimated that as a result of Israeli policies the physical
damage within the WBGS from September 2000 to December 2001 was $305 million,
much of which was in the agricultural sector. By the end of 2002, after Israel’s major
military operation that led to the reoccupation of the WBGS, this figure rose to $930
million.  Damage included losses associated with the demolition or destruction of9
greenhouses, poultry and livestock farms, wells, farm houses, irrigation systems and
ponds, fences and walls, main water pipelines, packaging and experiment station,
nurseries, crop, tree, and vegetable-planted land, as well as killed cattle, sheep, goats,
poultry, and damaged beehives.10
Another immediate impact was the loss of about 109,000 jobs between the third
and fourth quarters of 2000, a decline of 18 percent.  Employment in Israel and the11
settlements suffered the most, decreasing by about 90,000 at the end of 2000, and a
further 47,000 and 20,000 in 2001 and 2002, respectively.  This loss of employment12
had a huge impact on the Palestinian economy: real per capita GDP fell by 9.6 percent
in 2000, despite robust growth during the first three quarters. By 2005, real per capita
GDP was lower than its level in 1996 (Table A1). According to the World Bank, the
loss amounted to around 100,000 jobs in 2005 and directly affected the welfare of
about 700,000 people, or 20 percent of the WBGS population,  and resulted in lower13
standards of living. The World Bank further estimates that before the start of the
intifada, 20 percent of the population was living below the poverty line of $2.1/day.
That number increased to 27 percent by December 2000, 37 percent by December
2001, and 51 percent by December 2002. While in 1997, about 200,000 Palestinians
(8.5 percent of the population) received assistance from relief organizations, including
food aid, this rose to nearly 1.7 million by 2001, some 51 percent of the WBGS
population.14
Figure 1: Closure days in the WBGS, 1995-2005 
Source: U.N. Special Coordinator for Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) and
Palestinian Ministry of Labor (1995-2005).
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Policy issues
Food security: definition
One pair of scholars claims that by 1992 there were already about 200 definitions of
food security in the literature. But a careful definition adopted in 1996 by the World
Food Summit has been gaining widespread recognition. It notes that food security
exists “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient,
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active
and healthy life.”15
The definition emphasizes that food security has four essential components, all of
which need to be present before an individual (or household, or country) is considered
food secure. These are availability (that sufficient quantities of quality food are
present, whether produced domestically or imported), access (that individuals have
access to appropriate, nutritious diet), stability (that access to food is secured over
time without risk of losing access due to economic or climatic shocks), and use (that
food consumption is conjoint with clean water, adequate sanitation, and health care).
This definition emphasizes the demand side, consumption. Unlike earlier definitions
which concentrated almost exclusively on the supply side, this definition stresses the
dimension of access — entitlement to food — particularly by vulnerable people.16
Food supply
Food production in the WBGS fluctuates significantly from year to year, mainly due
to changes in weather conditions and the strong biannual cycle in olive production.
The total average value of food production during 1998/2000 stood at $835 million,
with the main items distributed as follows (in percent): vegetables (27), meat (26),
fruits (15), olives (14), milk (9), and eggs (4). Instability in agricultural production is
a major problem for producers, but not necessarily for consumers because commercial
food imports make up a large share of the diet. The value of annual net food imports
averaged $100 per person over the 1998-2000 period, with a total annual value of
$290 million. About 40 percent of the food import bill went to cereals, with smaller
percentage for fruits, dairy, and meat imports (11, 10, and 5 percent, respectively).
Over 87 percent of agricultural imports came from Israel. The WBGS’s deficit in its
agricultural trade balance with Israel was $335 million in 2000, or 24 percent of that
year’s total trade deficit.17
As for exports, vegetables are the largest earner of foreign exchange in the WBGS,
followed by fruits. In 1999-2000, these two foods accounted for 65 percent of the
agricultural export value. Vegetables are the only food sector showing net exports in
good weather years, implying that without the production of perishables such as fruits
and vegetables, the trade deficit would be considerably higher.
When the data on the value of production and net imports are combined, the
average value of the food
supply in the WBGS turns
out to be $385/person/year
for the 1996-1998 period.
The share of domestic
production in total food
availability is around 70
percent. When measured
in quantity or in value
terms, most of the food
consumed is domestically
p roduced ,  b u t  when
measured in terms of food
energy, most of the
c a lo r ie s  c o m e  fr o m
external sources.  This18
implies that access to food
markets, either in Israel or
internationally, is essential
to maintain a sufficient
food supply in the WBGS.
Because they have
limited growers’ ability to
reach their fields and
consumers’ access to import food markets, Israeli movement restrictions have been
detrimental to food supply in the WBGS. Table 1 makes clear that while the value of
domestic agricultural production did not decline drastically, agriculture value-added
since 2000 was either lower than, or only marginally above, the cost of inputs.
Movement restrictions have affected access through their impact on food prices.
These arise out of higher transport fees, longer delivery times, and other costs
associated with the unpredictability of movement restrictions. For example, importers
and exporters from the Gaza Strip experienced a tenfold increase in the cost of
transport from the port of Ashdod to Gaza ($2,300 per truck in 2006 as compared to
$250 before the intifada). As a result, food prices have been on the rise, particularly
in the Gaza Strip, where the food CPI increased by 12 percent in December 2006 as
compared to December 2005.19
Food consumption
For those engaged in light physical activity, the thresholds of food energy and protein
consumption considered sufficient to meet daily energy requirement is set by nutrition
experts at 2,100 kcal and 53 grams, respectively. The PCBS’s household surveys
Table 1: Agriculture in WBGS* (millions of
US$ in constant 1997 prices)
Value of Costs of Value
output inputs added
1994 611.3 212.9 398.4
1995 674.1 260.0 414.1
1996 760.6 278.6 482.0
1997 712.1 282.9 429.2
1998 834.0 351.1 482.9
1999 784.5 313.8 470.7
2000 742.6 354.6 388.0
2001 703.1 358.0 345.1
2002 779.0 399.0 380.0
2003 834.0 413.0 421.7**
2004 n/a n/a 470.7
Source: PCBS, Agricultural Statistics.
Notes: * Excluding East Jerusalem; **469.7 in
some PCBS publications (quarterly).
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indicate that food energy and protein consumption by the Palestinian population
averaged 2,114 kcal and 56.3 grams in 1996-1998 per person per day. These are
barely higher than the recommended thresholds.20
The data on food availability and levels of food energy and protein consumption
during 1996-1998, as reflected in aggregate data and household surveys, indicate that
Palestinians were relatively food secure then. However, this situation has changed
drastically since the beginning of the intifada in 2000. The deterioration in economic
conditions and the decline in standards of living as well as the increase in food prices
all have led to a rise in food insecurity. As such, economic access to food in terms of
purchasing power rather than the lack of food per se is the main constraint to securing
a healthy, nutritious diet. According to U.N.’s Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO), to cope with this situation, members of vulnerable households have been
consuming minimal amounts of expensive protein, with many meals consisting solely
of bread and tea.  Thus, one of the gravest consequences of high poverty rates is21
malnutrition. The World Bank estimates that per capita real food consumption has
declined by 25 percent between 1998 and the end of 2002. As a result, malnutrition
rates have increased. A PCBS nutrition survey finds a significant increase in both
acute and chronic malnutrition between 2000 and 2002.22
The stakeholders
Since food availability became a serious problem in the WBGS after 2000, following
the devastating repercussions of the Israeli measures, the FAO, in cooperation with
World Food Program (WFP), carried out the first detailed vulnerability assessment in
2003. The purpose was to identify the food insecure population and the factors and
causes of their insecurity and vulnerability.  The study confirmed that closures,23
constraints, and the separation barrier had and were continuing to have a damaging
impact on the livelihoods of the Palestinian people. At the same time, prolonging
these restrictions risks permanently damaging households’ recovery and undermining
their ability to attain food security in the long-term. More specifically, the assessment
concluded that food insecurity in 2003 was a real and constant threat for 1.4 million
people, or some four out of ten people in the WBGS. Furthermore, food insecurity
was found to be a near constant threat for an additional 1.1 million people (another
30 percent of the population).
In the West Bank, food insecurity is fairly widespread: 842,000 persons out of a
total population of 2.2 million, including East Jerusalem, were considered food
insecure. Great concentrations of the food insecure were found in pockets near the
Green Line and areas affected by the construction of the Israeli separation barrier, and
also near settlements and military zones where internal closure prevents access to land
and markets. For Gaza, it was estimated that an astonishing 41 percent of the
population (552,000 people) were food insecure.
In 2004, the WFP updated the FAO’s baseline survey. The new assessment
revealed a slight improvement in the overall conditions due to an easing of curfews
and the partial resumption of payments of clearance money from Israel to the PA. The
WFP put the total number of food insecure people in 2004 at 1.3 million (1.4 million
in 2003). The population at risk of being food insecure was estimated to amount to a
further 27 percent (30 percent in 2003). In-depth studies revealed that food insecurity
varies greatly at subgovernorate levels, being higher in areas close to settlements and
the wall where restrictions on physical movements and destruction of productive
assets are particularly high.24
The most relevant conclusion of this second vulnerability assessment was, yet
again, that food in the WBGS is generally available but access is limited due to
physical (curfews, closures) and economic reasons (high unemployment, depletion of
resources, exhaustion of coping strategies, and strained social support networks).
Households have been able to manage in these difficult circumstances, albeit with
dwindling resources and increased vulnerability to shocks and an increase in food
assistance.
The chronic poor and the new poor
Households most vulnerable to food insecurity are identified either as chronic poor
or new poor. The former are households with chronically sick or disabled members,
female headed households, widows, and the elderly without income. This category
includes refugees who are classified by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) as Special Hardship Cases (SHC); nonrefugees are classified as Hardship
Social Cases (HSC).  Most of the chronic poor were poor even before the intifada.25
Their livelihoods have not drastically changed but they have experienced a gradual
deterioration in their situation. The most vulnerable among the chronic poor are those
who do not receive assistance or food aid from any of the national welfare institutions
or humanitarian organizations. This group is the least well equipped to cope.
The new poor are those who, as a result of post-2000 turbulence and restrictions,
have lost their main source of livelihood. They include unemployed former wage
workers, those whose land has been confiscated or whose businesses have been
destroyed, people whose homes have been demolished, and farmers — including
Bedouin — fisher folk, and traders who have lost access to land, sea, or markets. The
productive assets and savings of this group are depleting fast, making it unlikely that
they would become food secure rapidly, even if conditions improved. The new poor
in the WBGS were estimated at 1.1 million people in 2003.
Food aid — although it would mitigate some of the worst effects of the economic
consequences of movement restrictions — is ineffective in tackling the root cause of
food insecurity of the new poor. Their vulnerability came about as a result of the
political upheavals. Accordingly, the only way to tackle the deterioration of food
security for this group would be to lift movement restrictions so that normality can be
restored and life returns to its regular mode.
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Food aid providers
To fulfill the needs of the large group of people which has become food insecure since
2000, a number of agencies and actors have been providing humanitarian assistance,
including food aid. These can be categorized in three types of institutions: (1)
Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions; (2) Palestinian NGOs and civil society
organizations; and (3) international organizations. The most important relief-type
programs offered by the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs are the program for
Social Hardship Cases (ca. 47,000 households) belonging to vulnerable groups like
female headed households, widows, orphans, and the elderly.  This program provides26
monthly cash payments and in-kind assistance. Another program is the social safety
net program which consists of 9 subprograms of which only the social protection
program is operational due to, among other reasons, the dramatic fall in the PA’s
revenues. The social protection program targets the poorest of the poor, some 10 to
15 percent of WBGS households.
The number of local and international NGOs providing charitable services in the
WBGS is large. Most, but certainly not all, of the food aid distributed by NGOs is
delivered to them originally from major international donor agencies such as the WFP
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Three major international
agencies provide regular food aid: (1) UNRWA provides assistance exclusively to
refugees in the WBGS (about 1.7 million); while all refugees in the WBGS are
entitled to UNRWA schooling and health care services, food and cash assistance are
confined to Special Hardship Cases; (2) the ICRC provides cash and food aid to
impoverished (nonrefugee) Palestinians; and (3) the WFP, the main provider of food
aid to nonrefugees. The WFP extends aid to food insecure families through a range
of relief and rehabilitation programs, usually via a third party, with population
group-specific food rations.
Food aid: scope and limits
Food assistance
As a result of the dramatic deterioration of the economic conditions and well being
in the WBGS since 2000, food assistance programs have expanded rapidly from a
small program focused on the chronic poor before the intifada to become a major
component of the social welfare system. Emergency food aid increased from 23,000
to 168,000 tons between 1999 and 2001 (Table A2), when about 1.7 million persons
in the WBGS were the target for food aid.
Out of the total number of 265,000 chronic poor in 2003, 115,000 received an
assistance package from UNRWA that provided a little over 1,700 kcal (75 percent
of which comes from flour and rice). This is only about 80 percent of the
recommended minimum energy requirements of 2,100 kcal. The rest of the chronic
poor, the 150,000 who meet WFP’s
criteria, received a food basket
containing 2,100 kcal of food. The
new poor, some 1.4 million people,
received a smaller food basket than
the chronic poor, being provided
with about 1,020 kcal rations for
refugees and 1,406 kcal for
nonrefugees. Clearly, those who
received food packages with these
amounts of food energy have to have access to substantial alternative sources of
income or assistance to be food secure.
A glance at the overall amounts of food aid delivered to the WBGS during the past
years reveals a trend increase, yet with sharp and unexplainable fluctuations: 184,000
tons in 2001; 81,000 in 2002; and 202,000 tons in 2004 (see Table A2). Given that the
number of the food insecure in the WBGS was either increasing or about stationary
(as during 2003-05), the sharp shifts in the delivered food aid cannot be explained by
parallel shifts in needs. Apparently, the volume of food aid is supply rather than
demand driven. Food aid is dependent on the capacity of the international community
to provide aid, rather than the humanitarian requirements of food insecure
Palestinians. Food aid may not be a reliable source to remedy food insecurity.
The effort of the international community would be more rewarding and
sustainable if targeted at resolving the root cause of food insecurity in the WBGS, that
is, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territory and movement restrictions. With
normality, when the Palestinian population is allowed to move about freely, run its
businesses, engage in import and export activities, utilize the available natural and
human resources, it would become food secure again. The shadow of hunger would
become a passing phenomenon associated with a temporary man-made catastrophe.
If the current state of affairs persists, food insecurity will become an integral part of
life in the WBGS whereby people become incapacitated and totally dependent on
charity, a situation totally avoidable if efforts are targeted in the right direction.
Estimates of food aid needs, 2004 and 2005-07
The FAO’s 2004 study argued that in order to meet the target of supporting the
chronic poor and the new poor, by providing them with the recommended 2,100 kcal
per day, total food aid to the WBGS should amount to about 350,000 tons in 2004, at
a cost of about $150 million. The cost of food assistance programs is low because the
proposed food baskets contain low-cost, high-energy foods, mainly cereals, sugar,
cooking oil, and pulses.  But being aware that this quantity of food aid may not be27
attainable, the study argued that when the chronic and new poor are supported with
the equivalent of about 1,020 kcal and 1,400 kcal, respectively, of food energy per
Food aid is dependent on the capacity
of the international community to
provide aid, rather than on the
humanitarian requirements of food
insecure Palestinians. Food aid may
not be a reliable source to remedy food
insecurity.
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person per day, a total of 208,000 tons of
food aid would be sufficient in 2004 (at $92.5
million). This is far below the recommended
food security minimum of 2,100 kcal per day.
The estimate assumes that some of the poor
have access to sufficient resources from other
sources to bring their diet to an adequate
level and cover their other necessities. But
obviously, with 1.4 million insecure persons,
many do not have access to any food.
The WFP study adopted this flawed
estimation approach when it estimated its
own food aid requirements for the WBGS for
the 2005-07 period. As noted earlier, WFP
estimated the number of the food insecure at
1.3 million. It starts by excluding about 42
percent of those, saying that as refugees they are UNRWA’s responsibility. Of the
remaining 752,000 food insecure persons, the WFP then proposes to assist only
480,000 of them, arguing that the other 272,000 people “are believed to have a wider
range of income opportunities and coping mechanisms.”28
The WFP plans to provide a food basket that provides the fortunate 480,000 with
about 2,000 kcal per day per person. Table 2 shows the content of the basket. The
selected food insecure persons will be approached via three channels: (1) direct free
food rations covering 365 days/year for 188,300 persons; (2) a daily meal for 10,600
persons in institutions (hospitals, orphanages, and elderly homes); and (3)
food-for-work (FFW) and food-for-training (FFT) programs. These programs are
designed to assist 281,100 of the new poor annually, with a focus on the creation or
rehabilitation of community assets and enhancement of skills, particularly for women.
Able-bodied members of targeted households will be requested to work 20-25 hours
per month to qualify for assistance (the programs offer a maximum of 8 months
employment per person per year). The W FP planned cover two years (September
2005 to August 2007). As can be seen from Table 3, W FP estimates that it needs
154,069 tones of food aid to fulfill its declared tasks. The total cost of the operation
is put at $80.9 million, of which only $49.1 million (or about 60 percent) is allocated
to the direct procurement of food.
The FFW and FFT programs insert a development dimension into humanitarian
food aid. When properly implemented, these programs can assist the new poor to
protect and promote their livelihoods. Local cooperating partners will help the WFP
to implement the FFW and FFT programs and to identify developmental needs.
Proposed areas of intervention include: (1) agricultural land reclamation, leveling and
terracing, tree planting, and road rehabilitation; (2) rehabilitating water cisterns and
sanitation systems; and (3) food-processing and literacy courses. Gender
considerations will play important role, and at least 70 percent of FFT participants
will be women. Yet even after recognizing some of the potentially bright aspects in
the food aid approach, our central point remains valid, and critical: food aid can never
be a viable, permanent solution to the WBGS’s food insecurity. Although food aid
initiatives have alleviated some of the hardship endured by Palestinians, the effort
would not be needed if WBGS normality were reestablished. A man-made catastrophe
has been at the heart of this devastating destruction and has turned an otherwise
dynamic people who, for decades, managed to maintain reasonable standards of
living, relatively high educational rates, and a functioning economy, into a group of
hungry dwellers waiting to be saved by meager food rations. The international
community would better resolve the food insecurity problem in Palestine by doing
what is needed to break down the cage that incarcerates the entire Palestinian
population.
 
Notes
Numan Kanafani is  Associate Professor at  the Institute of Food and Resource
Economics, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen. He may be reached
Table 2: Food basket and daily
ration (in gram)
All activities
Wheat flour    462
Oil      25
Pulses      40
Sugar      18
Iodized salt        5
Kcal/day/ person 2,046
Source: WFP (2005).
Table 3: World Food Program’s food aid project for the WBGS 2005/07 —
cost breakdown
Quantity Average Value
(metric ton) cost ($/ton) (US$)
Commodity 154,069    319.25 49,187,200
- Wheat flour 129,418    250.00 32,354,500
- Oil     6,003    950.00   5,702,850
- Olive oil     1,000 3,300.00   3,300,000
- Pulses   11,206    550.00   6,163,300
- Sugar     5,042    275.00   1,386,550
- Iodized salt     1,400    200.00      280,000
External transport 154,069      67.01 10,324,164
Landside transport, 154,069      52.34   8,064,100
   storage & handling
Other direct operational costs 154,069        8.96   1,380,000
Total direct support costs 154,069      43.00   6,625,200
Indirect support costs (7%) 154,069   5,290,646
Total WFP costs 80,871,310
Source: WFP (2005). 
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14. The number of Palestinians receiving aid in 1997 is taken from Hilal and Malki
(1997). The estimate of the number of people receiving food aid in 2002 is taken from
FAO (2004). Population data are from the PCBS (2006).
15. Maxwell and Smith (1992); FAO (2002, p. 25).
16. The attention to the demand side is closely identified with the seminal works of
Amartya Sen, e.g., Sen (1981). Hunger, according to Sen, results from entitlement
failure: a collapse in one’s ability to have command over sufficient amounts of food
due to loss of endowments or a sharp fall in the amount of food the endowments can
be exchanged with given the legal, political, economic, and social arrangements of the
community in which one lives.
17. PCBS, Agricultural Statistics (1999, 2000, 2001); PCBS (2002).
18. PCBS, Agricultural Statistics (1996, 1997, 1998). The WBGS’s dependency on
imports with respect to meat, dairy products, and fish consumption is almost total.
19. World Bank (2006). The price index data is taken from PCBS, Consumer Price
Index (2005, 2006).
20. FAO (2004); the food consumption data are obtained through PCBS household
expenditure and consumption surveys undertaken during 1996-1998.
21. FAO (2004).
22. World Bank (2003, paragraph 2.4).
23. FAO (2004).
24. WFP (2005).
25. UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East.
26. The UNRWA’s programs are not connected with the PA’s programs. Unlike the
latter, the latter exclusively support the refugees.
27. WFP (2005).
28. WFP (2005, p. 7).
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Table A1: West Bank and Gaza Strip estimated macroeconomic trends
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Per capita GNI (constant 1997$)* 1,601.2 1,526.5 1,638.5 1,815.2 1,888.9 1,684.6 1,411.1 1,267.8 1,291.6 n/a n/a
Per capita GDP (constant 1997$)* 1,388.2 1,347.8 1,437.7 1,546.2 1,612.3 1,458.3 1,301.8 1,191.3 1,184.8 1,217.8 1,268.2
Per capita GNI (real annual growth, %)  1.6 -4.7 7.3 10.8 4.1 -10.8 -16.2 -10.2  1.9 n/a n/a
Per capita GDP (real annual growth, %) -1.0 -2.9 6.7   7.5 4.3 -  9.6 -10.7 -  8.5 -0.5 2.8 4.1
Investment ($mn) 1,019.5 1,129.1 1,267.0 1,501.3 2,010.4 1,467.4 1,186.2    727.2 1,126.3 n/a n/a
Exports ($mn)    667.1    729.3    767.5    919.8    953.8    889.1    605.2    565.0    442.8    449.0 n/a
Imports ($mn) 2,568.1 2,827.4 3,028.4 3,448.5 4,094.2 3,505.2 3,155.5 2,615.1 2,929.9 2,292.0 n/a
Employment (‘000) 309.0 432.0 467.2 533.6 591.6 595.2 508.1 487.1 590.7 604.4 633.0
- of which in Israel (%)   16.2   14.1   17.1   21.7   23.0   19.6   13.8   10.3     9.7     8.7     9.9
Labor participation ratio (%) 39.0 40.0 40.5 41.4 41.6 41.5 38.7 38.1 40.4 n/a n/a
Unemployment rate (%) 39.3 37.5 29.6 20.9 17.2 19.1 29.5 35.6 31.8 n/a n/a
- open unemployment (%) 18.2 23.8 20.3 14.4 11.8 14.1 25.5 31.3 25.6 n/a n/a
- underemployment (%) 21.1 11.9   9.3   6.5   5.4   5.0   4.0   4.3   6.2 n/a n/a
Poverty rate (% of pop. with < $2.1/day) n/a n/a n/a n/a 20.0 27.0 37.0 51.0 47.0 n/a 51.0
Food price index (1996=100) n/a 100.0 106.2 113.9 119.3 121.2 120.7 123.8 129.5 132.3 137.6
Sources: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), national accounts (various issues), labor force survey (various issues), consumer price index (various issues). Poverty
data from World Bank (2004; 2006).
* Excluding East Jerusalem.
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Table A2: Global food aid deliveries to the Palestinian Territories, 1990-2005 (in tons; cereals grain equivalent)
CEREALS NON-CEREALS ALL FOOD
-------Emergency------- Program --Project-- ------Emergency------ --------Project-------- Emerg. Program Project Total
DT LP TP DT DT LP DT LP TP DT LP TP
1990   7,192      718   2,396   7,986   7,491       19 1,157   17,817   9,144   26,961
1991 46,182   7,535   1,233 12,285    200    262   66,203   1,495   67,699
1992   6,276   4,906   1,626 1,113   6,203        48    360   43   17,434   3,142   20,577
1993   8,339   6,554   4,889 1,000   4,428      933    638   20,254   6,527   26,782
1994 16,549 21,659   2,864 4,544   5,051      292    168 168   43,551   7,745   51,297
1995 15,613 22,876   1,442    230   7,117      387    295 332   45,995   2,300   48,295
1996   1,898   5,605      888   3,182 150   11,573      150   11,724
1997      274      165   6,759 2,483   2,850      20 2,185 215     3,309 11,644   14,953
1998   7,500      219   8,936 3,856   3,044 15,659    738 721   26,422 14,253   40,676
1999 18,915      912   3,569 14,144 1,800   3,775   23,603   3,569 15,944   43,118
2000   4,244      890   6,795 10,771   3,544 30,284   45,757 10,771   56,529
2001 98,992   5,177 52,350 12,193   3,273    419   9,825   2,057 219 168,402 12,193   3,911 184,507
2002 30,800 11,020 19,960   4,223   4,175    764   6,782    178   3,986   72,728   4,223   4,940   81,891
2003 21,732   5,418 28,246   4,436    809   5,803   66,447   66,447
2004 89,697 30,075 65,031   3,924   3,747 1,374   8,297    421 198,223   4,346 202,569
2005 16,076 39,599 12,287   1,412 2,947   7,492   79,815   79,815
Source: Data provided by Interfais (International Food Aid Information System); World Food Program (WFP). 
Notes: Food aid categories: (1) emergency food aid: aid destined to victims of natural or man-made disasters. It is freely distributed to targeted beneficiary groups, and is usually
provided on a grant basis and usually channeled via multilateral organizations; (2) project food aid: aid that aims at supporting specific poverty-reduction and disaster-prevention
activities. It is usually freely distributed to targeted beneficiary groups, but may also be sold on the open market and is then referred to as "monetized" food aid. (3) program
food aid: aid which is usually supplied as a resource transfer for balance of payments or budgetary support activities. Delivery mode: DT (direct transfers): Food aid originating
from a donor country; LP (local purchases): food aid procured in a country and used as food aid in the same country. For example, the WFP was planning to purchase 1,000
tones of olive oil from poor Palestinian farmers who owe 3 ha or less of land during 2005/07; TP (triangular transaction): food aid purchases or exchanges in one country for
use as food aid in another developing country.
